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Last year, in Volume III, Numbers 1 and 2, the authors of this
article discussed the influence of modern methods of hard mineral
exploration and development upon the mining laws applicable to the
appropriation of public mineral lands in Wyoming. The law of mines
and mining on the public domain, however, goes beyond the initial
appropriation and completion of the acts of location. In this article,
therefore, the authors examine the nature of a locator's interest in
his mining claim, as illustrated by the principles which determine
whether titles to unpatented mining claims are maintained or terminated.

POSSESSORY INTERESTS IN WYOMING
MINING CLAIMS t
Don H. Sherwood*
Gary L. Greer**
INTRODUCTION
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HE nature of a locator's interest in his mining claim is
essentially possessory' and therefore demands regulart Copyright@ Don H. Sherwood and Gary L. Greer, 1969.
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1. The fact that the paramount title to land in which mines lie is in the
United States does not affect the mining title thereto, since "each case
shall be adjudged by the law of possession." 30 U.S.C. § 53 (1964). Occupation of such land is authorized by Congress, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), and
the possessory nature of the title granted in 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964) is
emphasized in 30 U.S.C. §§ 28, 30 and 38 (1964). Cf. WYo. STAT. § 30-8
(1957). See also Sherwood & Greer, Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The
Wyoming Example, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, n. 1, and at 6-12 (1968).
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if not constant-attention from him. ' So, unlike other kinds
of property, with which mining claims are often equated,'
the extent and character of the interest' created by appropriation,' upon completion of the acts of location of public
mineral lands,' may vary from time to time thereafter
Indeed, a great many things may happen to a mining claim
between the time of its initiation and its eventual patenting,
abandonment or termination. It is therefore appropriate to
conclude our review of the law of mines and mining on the
public domain in Wyoming with a discussion of the mining
claim itself, as defined by the rights and obligations of its
owner after he has-at least ostensibly-located it.'
We have pointed out elsewhere' that a mining claim may
be initiated and recorded, by chance or by design, prior to
the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit.1" One must then
consider the interest of the locator of a claim located in
advance of discovery as well as the interest of the discoverer
who has completed all of the acts of location. The contrast
between the two, in fact, almost perfectly describes the
nature of the statutory creature we call a mining claim and
think of as property.
2. See, e.g., Birchfield v. Thiercof, 5 Ariz. App. 484, 428 P.2d 148, reh'g
denied, 6 Ariz. App. 20, 429 P.2d 512 (1967), where the constant attention
required of one without title to a claim occupied by him is distinguished
from the regular or minimum annual attention permitted in the case of
the owner of a valid claim. In Birchfield, the Court held that as against
a stranger entering peaceably upon an existing claim for exploration purposes, only actual and continuous possession will protect one without title
to the existing claim from relocation, even if annual labor has been performed. There was, in this case, a gap in the chain of title from the
original locator of the claim to the one claiming the benefit of the assessment work performed upon the claim, and insufficient evidence to establish title by adverse possession prior to the stranger's relocation.
3. See, e.g., Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639, 644-645
(1935), and the cases there cited, especially Wilbur v. United States ez rel.
Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316-317 (1930). Cf. United States v. Etcheverry,
230 F.2d 193, 195 (10th Cir. 1956), and Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840,
844-845 (9th Cir. 1964).
4. The'locator's interest may also depend upon the type of mining claim
utilized, as discussed in Sherwood & Greer, supra note 1, at 12-32.
5. Alternative methods of appropriation and forms of location are discussed
in Sherwood & Greer, Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The Wyoming Example, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 319, 322-328 (1968) (reprinted in 6 ROcKY
MT. MINERAL L. REV. 43 (1968)).
6. See id. at 330-352.
7. At least until patent issues, if applied for, in which case the appropriation
becomes a fee title. 30 U.S.C. §§ 29-38 (1964).
8. See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5, at 330-333.
9. Id.at 330-352.
10. One may even question whether it can be otherwise since the decision in
United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968). But see Converse v.
Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1968).
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INTERESTS IN CLAIMS LOCATED

BEFEom DISCOVERY: Pedis Possessio

We have already observed that today the search for
ore bodies which offer few surface indications of their presence, size, shape and extent is likely to result in the prospector making his discovery sometime later" than his identification of a particular "target" area.'" Drilling programs,
of course, require considerable time, as well as money, and to
complete even one such program the prospector will have to
spend several days or even weeks at a particular site or sites,
occupying the public lands with personnel and equipment.

His presence for such extended periods on public lands without having made a discovery creates several problems. What,
for example, is the prospector's legal status while he is
attempting to make a discovery of valuable minerals on
public lands? Does he have rights and privileges there or
is he merely a trespasser? If he has some right to occupy the

public lands, how are his rights defined? How can he protect himself and his operation from interference and encroachment by other like-minded prospectors? Since the

latter may be attracted primarily by his activity, it is quite
necessary that these questions be answered with some certainty if the prospector is to be provided with the minimum
assurance of security which he must have in his land position
before he commits the large sum required for a modern
exploration program.
11. Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5, at 330-333. We have modified the usual
order of presentation of the subject matter to take account of this in that
we first discussed the performance of the various acts of location and then
examined the discovery requirement in some detail. See id. at 353-362. We
now retrace our steps to reflect upon the legal status of the locator's
presence and activities on the public domain before and after he makes
his discovery.
12. See Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308, 319 (1958), where it is
suggested that exploration for oil under the early oil placer claims was
similar to that of the modern quest for hard minerals at great depth and
that the rules applicable to oil placers ought likewise to apply, for example,
to lode claims located for deep deposits. The suggestion should alert Wyoming mining lawyers to the relevance of such cases as Granlick v. Johnston,
29 Wyo. 349, 213 P. 98 (1923); Sparks v. Mount, 29 Wyo. 1, 207 P. 1099
(1922); Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881, 129
P. 1023 (1913) ; Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856 (1908), and Whiting
v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849 (1908), to modern problems.
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In our search for the source and nature of pre-discovery
rights of occupancy of public lands we may begin with the
policy expressed by Congress in the General Mining Law :"s
...

all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging

to the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed,
shall be free and open to exploration and purchase,
and the lands in which they are found to occupation
and purchase ....
That Congressional policy, designed to encourage exploration
and development of mineral resources, is an invitation to
prospectors, and is implemented by an appropriation system
which conditions one's right to lay claim to minerals upon
the discovery of valuable deposits. This creates obvious
"chicken and egg" problems. How is a prospective locator
to make his discovery? Certainly not in absentia. Since it
is necessary for him to be on the public domain, looking for
minerals, for some time before he actually finds them, the
courts quite naturally, and wisely, have construed the law
in such a way as not only to permit entry onto the public
lands for prospecting, but also to account for and protect
that occupancy which necessarily precedes discovery. Thus,
while a prospector might not have a true "location" until
after he makes his discovery, he might nevertheless enter
onto certain ground, and, by virtue of his occupation and
possession of it, be protected against forcible or fraudulent
entry or intrusion by others until such time as he does make
a discovery.1"
30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). This section is the same as R.S. § 2319, about
which the United States Supreme Court said in Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249
U.S. 337, 346 (1919): "Nevertheless, section 2319 extends an express invitation to all qualified persons to explore the lands of the United States for
valuable mineral deposits, and this and the following sections hold out
to one who succeeds in making discovery the promise of a full reward."
In advance of discovery an explorer is sometimes said to be a licensee or
tenant-at-will on the public domain. See Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920).
14. While the statutory scheme of location suggests that all the acts of location
must be predicated on a prior discovery of valuable minerals within the
limits of the claim, and the cases often contain language to the effect that
there can be no "location" without a discovery, e.g., Columbia Copper
Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo. 244, 79
P. 385 (1905), it has been established beyond doubt that discovery may
follow rather than precede, such acts. See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5,
at 330-333. As was said in the leading case of Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249
U.S. 337, 346 (1919):
For since, as a practical matter, exploration must precede the
discovery of minerals, and some occupation of the land ordinarily
is necessary for adequate and systematic exploration, legal recognition of the pedis possessio of a bona fide and qualified prospector
is universally regarded as a necessity.
13.
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The judicially conceived doctrine of pedis possessio,'" as
this pre-discovery right is usually called, thus helps fill a
conceptual vacuum"8 in the statutory appropriation scheme
and provides both a justification for occupancy' and a rationCompare, e.g., Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840, 845-846 (9th Cir. 1964):
A common practice in the western states among prospectors who
intend more than a casual exploration of an area thought to contain mineral is first to locate, mark and record the boundaries of
the claim, and then to expend time, labor, money and energy on
the prospect. Such occupation and working of the claim, even
before discovery, gives the locator a limited defendable right of
possession and a right which is, in some respects, alienable. The
right of pedis possessio is one which may be transferred by transfer of possession because it rests on actual possession, accompanied
by deed, lease or assignment of the color of title represented by
the local location and recording of the claim. Miller v. Chrisman
(1903), 140 Cal. 440, 73 P. 1083, 74 P. 444; United Western
Minerals Company v. Hannsen (1961), 147 Colo. 272, 363 P.2d
677; Weed v. Snook (1904), 144 Cal. 439, 77 P. 1023; Jose v.
Utley (1921), 185 Cal. 656, 199 P. 1037....
Whatever may be the rights acquired by a prospector, who locates
a mining claim prematurely and before actual discovery of valuable mineral, in the defense of his actual possession against third
persons, it is clear under both the mining law and the regulations
that a discovery of valuable mineral is the sine qua non of an
entry to initiate vested rights against the United States. The
premature location of such a claim and the recordation of certificates or notices of location cast a cloud upon the title of the
United States to the lands, as the law contemplates that discovery
must coincide with the physical location of the claims....
This is not to say that citizens, and those who have declared their
intention to become such, do not also have and enjoy a statutory
right to prospect and explore the public domain. Nor do we imply
that it is an actionable wrong for a good faith prospector to locate
a claim in furtherance and in protection of the rights of pedis
possesso while pursuing his more thorough exploration. But the
validity of his title, claimed and asserted by the location of the
claim and the recordation of notices, depends upon the resolution
of a question of fact, that is, has there been a discovery of valuable mineral within the limits of the claim?
15. "Pedis possessio. Lat. A foothold; an actual possession. To constitute
adverse possession there must be pedis possessio, or a substantial inclosure.
2 Bouv. Inst. no. 2193; Baily v. Irby, 2 Nott & McC. (S.C.) 343, 10 Am.
Dec. 609. Black, Law Dictionary (3rd Ed. 1951). The phrase 'pedis possessio' means actual possession. Kendrick v. Lathem, 25 Fla. 819, 6 So. 871,
876; Goldberg v. Bruschi, 146 Cal. 708, 81 P. 23, 25. 'Actual possession', as
a legal phrase, is put in opposition to the other phrase, 'possession in law',
or 'constructive possession'. Actual possession is the same as 'pedis possessio' or 'pedis positio', and these mean a foothold on the land and actual
entry and possession in fact, a standing upon it, and occupation of it, as
a real, demonstrative act done. It is the contrary of a possession in law,
which follows in the wake of title, and is called 'constructive possession'.
[Citing cases]." Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248
F. Supp. 708, 724, n. 45 (D. Utah 1965).
16. The statute, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), "does not grant to citizens of the
United States the single right to locate, explore and exploit mining claims
on the public domain. The statute grants two rights, (1) the right to
explore and purchase all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to
the United States; and (2) the right to occupation and purchase of the
lands in which valuable mineral deposits are found. The right to explore,
that is,prospect for valuable minerals on public lands, cannot be telescoped with the right to locate the mining claim and occupy and exploit
it for its valuable mineral content after such minerals have been found."
Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840, 844-845 (9th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added).
17. "It is held that upon the public domain a miner may hold the place in
which he may be working against all others having no better right, and
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ale for assigning priorities to the rights of competing claimants who hope to find, but have not as yet found, minerals
on the public lands.18
Recognizing at the outset, as we must, that pedis possessio
is not a doctrine which can be applied against the United
States, at least in the absence of statute,"9 the Wyoming cases
applicable to disputes between rival locators merit consideration in some detail. If one remembers that those cases involving oil placer locations were governed after February 25,
1920, by a special statute,"° not available today to appropriators of locatable minerals, the principles pertinent to other
aspects of these cases are nonetheless still revelant to pedis
possessio cases.
The doctrine of pedis possessio was first elaborated in
Wyoming in the case of Whiting v. Straup,' where, in apply-

18.
19.

20.

21.

while he remains in possession, diligently working towards discovery, is
entitled-at least for a reasonable time-to be protected against forcible,
fraudulent and clandestine intrusions upon his possession." Union Oil Co.
v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-347 (1919).
See note 24 infra.
In Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1964), involving a dispute between locators and the United States, the locators argued that mining
claims located for the purpose of prospecting the land before the discovery
of valuable mineral thereon insure a valid possessory title to the land
embraced within the claim enforceable against the United States. The
Court rejected this contention, saying: "From earliest times in the history
of mining, the courts have uniformly held that a discovery of valuable
mineral must coincide with compliance with the legal requirements for
locating a claim before valid ownership of the property has been established. Whenever such coincidence does occur, the locator has acquired a
vested property right enforceable and defendable against the United States
as well as third persons." Id. at 845. Cf. note 14 supra. The Davis case
involved public domain and the powers of the Bureau of Land Management.
It is not clear that the result should be the same in the case of contests
initiated by action of the Forest Service, since there are statutes expressly
prohibiting interference by the Forest Service with prospecting and prospectors. 16 U.S.C. §§ 471, 472, 475, 478 and 482 (1964).
Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, § 37, 41 Stat. 451, as amended, now 30 U.S.C.
§ 193 (1964). This section, making oil and gas, theretofore locatable under
the Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526, formerly 30 U.S.C. § 101,
subject to disposition by lease, saved "valid claims existent on February 25,
1920, and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which
initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery." 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1964) (emphasis added).
17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849 (1908). In this case, Straup and three others located
an eighty-acre association placer which was conveyed, prior to a discovery,
first to a corporation, and then to Straup, who later conveyed the south
half (40 acres) of the claim to Phillips, who then conveyed a one-half
undivided interest therein to Whiting. Thereafter, Straup was employed
by one Bijur, who represented an association, to drill a well on the north half
of the claim; after discovery, a second well was drilled on the south half,
and a new claim was located in behalf of Straup's employer-association,
which included the south half of the old claim. The association then conveyed the new claim to a corporation. Straup's deed to Phillips was held
not to estop his subsequent employer from questioning the validity of
Straup's original location and the possession of Phillips and Whiting.
Since Straup's quit-claim deed conveyed only his pedis possessio to Phillips,
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ing the traditional rule, the Court pointed out that if there
is no discovery to support a location, the land is "vacant and
unappropriated, except so far as it might be in the actual
possession of some one." The Court went on to say:2
Though such a location must rest upon discovery,
and will not be complete until the discovery is made,
it is not required, in the absence of intervening
rights, that discovery shall precede the other acts of
location. If made prior to any intervening rights,
though subsequent to marking the boundaries and
recording the claim, the location, if otherwise good,
will be validated at least from the date of discovery.
Applying these rules, the Court in Whiting found on the
evidence that a prior claim had been successfully "jumped"
because the prior claimants did not maintain actual possession for the purpose of prosecuting work looking to a discovery and therefore could not exclude others who entered
peaceably.
A more typical and orthodox example of the kind of
dispute that might arise and of the technique for resolving
it can be found in the case of Sparks v. Mount. " There, the
defendants' predecessors in interest were the first to lay
claim to the ground in dispute, filing an oil placer location
in February of 1918. But having taken this step, no further
efforts to make a discovery were attempted on the claim.
Nearly eighteen months later, on August 29, 1919, the plaintiffs' predecessors in interest came onto the then unoccupied
ground and located another oil placer. In November, 1919,
the plaintiffs, having acquired the interest of their predecessors, entered and began drilling. They erected a small building on the land and continued to drill for oil, until one night
in December when someone sabotaged their well. Two days
later the defendants moved drilling equipment onto the ground
and in another two days were drilling their own well. Plaintiffs protested and notified defendants to vacate the ground
within their claim. Plaintiffs also started drilling another
and Phillips and Whiting were found not to be in actual possession of
south half of the claim at the time Straup re-entered in behalf of
subsequent employer, the decision is clearly correct. See Birchfield
Thiercof, 5 Ariz. App. 484, 428 P.2d 148, reh'p denied, 6 Ariz. App.
429 P.2d 512 (1967).
22. Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 854 (1908).
23. 29 Wyo. 1, 207 P. 1099 (1922).
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well. Five days after they had started, the defendants, who
had ignored the demand that they vacate the ground, made
the first discovery. Plaintiffs brought an injunction suit
to enjoin further trespass by the defendants. The defendants
won a dismissal in the trial court, but on appeal the Supreme
Court reversed, reasoning that at the time the plaintiffs made
their entry on August 29, 1919, the ground was open to entry
because the defendants' predecessors had made no attempt
to take or maintain possession under the original 1918 location. Conversely, at all times after the August 29th entry,
the plaintiffs or their predecessors had continued in possession, diligently pursuing their efforts to make a discovery.
The plaintiffs thus were to be protected against hostile or
clandestine entry by others, including defendants, by the
right of pre-discovery pedis possessio, and it did not matter
that the defendants, having intruded and trespassed against
the plaintiffs, won the drilling "race" to discovery. 4
24. It is occasionally suggested that where two competing claimants are searching for minerals in the same ground, a "race" situation is created and
the first to make a discovery is the winner. Such "races" of course can
be conducive to hostilities, sabotage, and breaches of the peace. One of the
functions of the pedia posseasio rule is to establish priority in one of the
competing prospectors on the basis of prior legal right, thereby avoiding
any need for warfare between drilling crews. Whenever it can be established that one party is entitled to protection by virtue of pedis possessio,
then it makes no difference that the other party wins the discovery "race."
Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958). Cf. Granlick v.
Johnston, 29 Wyo. 349, 213 P. 98 (1923), in which case the first locator
or claimant of certain oil placer ground failed to establish a pedis possessio
right in himself to exclude the second locator because the evidence showed
a "relaxation" by him of his possession or the right thereto. Subsequently,
the second locator entered peaceably, The Wyoming Court correctly found
that because of a failure of "continued actual occupancy" on the part of
the first locator, his claim was subject to entry by others, if that entry
was not forcible, clandestine or fraudulent. Unfortunately, however, the
court suggested that the first locator's dilatoriness, coupled with the
second locator's entry, set up a race in which the right of possession ultimately would fall to the first to prosecute diligently to discovery. A better
statement of the rule appears in Adams v. Benedict, supra, 327 P.2d at 316317, where the New Mexico Court first quotes from Union Oil Co. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337, 348 (1919), as follows:
Whatever the nature and extent of a possessory right before
discovery, all authorities agree that such possession may .be maintained only by continued actual occupancy by a qualified locator
or his representatives engaged in persistent and diligent prosecution of work looking to the discovery of mineral.
and then goes on to say:
. . . possession of each claim, where no valid location has been
perfected . . . must be protected by actual occupation of that
identical claim and the diligent and persistent exploratory work
thereon. If the occupation is relaxed under those circumstances,
another may take possession of the claim if he can do so peaceably.
The occupation of the second occupant, in that event, will be protected so long as he abides by this same rule.
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The Sparks case illustrates both the principal policy and
the limitation 5 on the pedis possessio rule. The purpose of
the rule is to guarantee to one in possession of mineral ground
an assured land position as against intruders and to encourage him to feel secure in committing his time and resources
to mineral development. Someone in the position of the plaintiffs in Sparks should be able, upon observing vacant, or
apparently vacant, ground, to enter upon it and search for
minerals, assured that he may protect his right to do so by
remaining in possession, in good faith, diligently exploring
or working toward a discovery. Conversely, it is no more
than fair to require of one relying on pedis possessio that he
manifest his possession by continued actual occupancy and
bona fide, diligent effort to make a discovery within a reasonable time.2" The requirement is necessary to prevent monopolization of desirable public lands by those who, not having
made discoveries, merely hope to stockpile lands for speculative purposes. In Sparks, a failure in this regard was held
to mean that the interest of the defendants' predecessors was
not such at the time of plaintiffs' entry as to be entitled to
protection, defendants' predecessors not having maintained
their rights.
Numerous difficulties attend the doctrine of pedis possessio and its application. For example, in attempting to
guarantee the right of one in possession to remain in exclusive possession of public lands, the courts have, with a certain
logic, developed a corollary to the rule, the requirement that
the possessor's possession must have been exclusive. That is,
he must have excluded others from his location. Any relaxation of the claim to exclusive possession may result in loss
25.

The doctrine must be viewed both as conferring rights on those in possession under the prescribed circumstances and as depriving them of rights
whenever the principal conditions, i.e., good faith, due diligence, continued
actual possession, and prosecution of work towards discovery, are no longer
met. See Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp.

708, 722, n. 36 (D. Utah 1965).
26.

Hodgson v. Midwest Oil Co., 17 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1927). What constitutes
sufficient occupancy, and what is a reasonable time, depend, of course, on
the circumstances of the case and, particularly, on the presence or absence
of a competing claimant asserting an intervening, better right. See Phillips
v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856 (1908), a case which was found to depend
on the issue of whether pedis possessio was established ahead of a competing location and in which it was made clear that pedis possessio will protect
a locator even though he delays taking possession for several months after
completing the other acts of location, provided there are no intervening
rights.
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of the right to continue in exclusive possession." The inevitable result is that the possessor must walk a legal tightrope.
If he has misjudged his right, he risks unlawfully excluding
others from the public domain.28 On the other hand, he risks
loss of his own possessory right if he fails to exclude others
and suffers peaceable entry. 9 Inevitably, difficult questions
about what constitutes possession, 3° or good faith,3 ' or diligence," are involved. Occasionally, the spectacle of a head-on
confrontation between parties who3 may have miscalculated
their pedis possessio rights occurs.
Often the modern miner searching for deeply situated,
widely disseminated deposits will find an area of interest
considerably larger than the size of one claim and too large
for actual occupancy of all of the land on any practical
basis.84 Nevertheless, it is clear that pedis possessio requires
actual occupancy of each claim,85 there being no basis on
which to hold a block of several claims by possession of one
of them even though operations conducted on one claim may
ultimately lead to a discovery of mineral on more than one,
and even though there is no practical necessity for occupancy
of more than a small surface area in order to develop an
extensive underground ore body. These and other diffi27. Granlick v. Johnston, 29 Wyo. 849, 213 P. 98 (1923).
28. Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708 (D.
Utah 1965).
29. Granlick v. Johnston, 29 Wyo. 349, 213 P. 98 (1923).
30. E.g., Sparks v. Mount, 29 Wyo. 1, 207 P. 1099 (1922). See note 36 infra.
31. The right to make a location cannot be exercised in trespass, or fraudulently.
See Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708
(D. Utah 1965), where a defendant whose rights fell short of pedis possessio
nevertheless prevailed over its opponent, whose agent had at an earlier
time been employed by defendant's predecessor in interest and was thereby
disabled from acquiring an intervening right. But cf. Whiting v. Straup,
17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849 (1908).
32. E.g., Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856 (1908).
33. The most picturesque modern example is found in Adams v. Benedict, 64
N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958), where it is reported that appellant attempted physically to block the passage of appellee's bulldozer onto his claim
and was carried along on or by the bulldozer for some 25 to 50 yards
before he was removed from the front of it.
84. See, e.g., Titanium Actynite Indus. Inc. v. McLennan, 272 F.2d 667 (10th
Cir. 1959); Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957),
noted in 13 WYO. L.J. 43 (1958).
35. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
36. "[A] distinction is clearly drawn between rights of locators after a discovery, where constructive possession is sufficient as against other claimants, and rights of locators prior to discovery, where there is protection
afforded a claimant only if he is in 'actual occupancy'." Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 723 (D. Utah 1965). A
somewhat perplexing question may also exist concerning the extent to
which pedi8 possessio protects a claimant even on one claim. Conceivably,
he might be protected (and entitled to exclude others) only as to that
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culties seriously detract from the usefulness of the pedis
possessio doctrine in a modern context. But while the prospector might feel more secure, and his attorney more comfortable, if the courts-which, after all, created the doctrine
of pedis possessio-extended the doctrine to protect the locator's interest in a not unreasonably large group of claims,
appropriate inquiries into the extent that the locator's activities do tend reasonably and promptly to prospect an entire
group of claims systematically, would necessarily substitute
the subsequent judgment of the judiciary for the initial judgment of the prospector and his geologist. Since there is a
tendency to leave the determination of what is reasonable to
the initial judgment of the miner," even a rule of reasonableness can become arbitrary, and an arbitrary rule is certain
to promote speculation and restrict competition as surely as
it would provide pre-discovery protection. If the amount of
litigation is any gauge, application of the doctrine in its
present form, coupled with the liberal test of discovery as
between rival locators, seems to create few problems. Most
alternatives would, in effect, substitute some form of lottery
system for the basic rule of appropriation which protects
the first discoverer rather than the first bettor.
INTEREST OF LOCATOR AFTER

DISCOvERY

Both discovery"8 and performance of all of the acts of
location"9 are essential to a completed appropriation of public
mineral lands. Just as it sometimes happens that a prospector
may lay out his claim in advance of discovery,"° he may also
make his discovery in advance of performing all of the acts
of location. It is therefore appropriate to define the nature

37.

38.
39.
40.

certain ground in which he actually is in possession or to that portion
of the claim vertically in which he is exploring. Adams v. Benedict, 64
N.M. 234, 827 P.2d 308 (1958), sensibly, we think, suggests that a prospector is entitled to possession of the full claim he intends to locate during
the time he is diligently engaged in an effort to make a discovery, at least
where he has given notice of the extent of that claim by defining the
boundaries of the claim he proposes to perfect.
See AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.6, n. 4 (1960).
See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5, at 353-362.
Id. at 330-333.
See discussion and text at notes 11-37 supra on the rights of one in possession prior to discovery.
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of the rights and interest of a discoverer both before41 and
after completion of all the acts of location prescribed by law.4 2
Until he has done some act demonstrating his intent to
appropriate the discovered minerals, the discoverer remains
merely a prospector, who has advantageous knowledge but
no appropriation. But when he begins his appropriation by
doing the acts of location his status changes to that of "locator" in the fullest sense. Upon posting the required location
notice, the locator is entitled to exclusive possession of his
claim during the period prescribed by statute for completing
the acts of location." Thus a conflicting junior location
attempted during this period is void.4 4 Further, upon completion of all of the acts of location, the discoverer has a valid,
perfected mining location, secure from divestiture so long
as the claim is maintained as provided by law.4" The combination of discovery and the appropriative acts thus operate
to segregate mineral land from the public domain. This land,
and the minerals thus segregated, are said to constitute private property in the fullest sense of that term." While the
41. While it is sometimes emphasized that the right of pedis possessio is
strictly a pre-discovery right having nothing whatever to do with the
post-discovery status of a prospective locator, it should be readily apparent
that the status is in no way diminished by the fact of discovery, but
rather, is enhanced thereby. See Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v.
Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 723 (D. Utah 1965). A discoverer of
mineral is, in the strictest sense, the only person entitled by law to make
a valid location. See WYO. STAT. §§ 30-1 and 30-3 (1957); Columbia
Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo. 244,
79 P. 385 (1905). Yet, one who merely knows of the existence of minerals
on the public domain and has not yet acted to appropriate them has no
rights which are substantially superior to one whose only right is prediscovery pedis-possessio.
42. Posting of notice, recording of claim, marking of boundaries, and, where
required, discovery work. See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5, at 333-352.
43. Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673
(1910). Read literally, Wyo. STAT. § 30-1 (1957) imposes on discoverers
a sixty-day time limit within which they must act to record their claims.
The type of information prescribed for the recorded certificate practically
requires performance of the acts of location during the sixty-day period,
at least as against a potential relocator. Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5,
at 341, n. 120. It is clear that protection at this stage does not depend on
actual possession, Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248
F. Supp. 708 (D. Utah 1965).
44. Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673
(1910). The segregation of the lands from location by others is temporary
in that expiration of the statutory time for performance of the acts of
location makes the ground once again open to entry by one who is able to
establish an "intervening right." Cf. Columbia Copper Mining Co. v.
Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385 (1905).
Questions of the relative rights of a delinquent locator attempting to resume
work as against a relocator are discussed below.
45. Claim maintenance requirements are discussed below.
46. See note 3 supra. The Act of July 23, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-167, ch. 375,
§§ 3-7, 69 Stat. 368, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-615 (1964), no doubt
qualifies the scope of the owner's property interest in an unpatented mining
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exact nature of the estate acquired by a locator may be somewhat difficult to define,47 the significant variances between
an unpatented mining title and the title to other real property
are the facts that: (1) the paramount title remains, until and
unless patented, in the government, 4 and (2) the miner's
interest is merely possessory," and, as such, is subject to
defeasance by either abandonment"° or forfeiture.5
CLAIM MAINTENANCE AND THE
ANNUAL WORK REQUIREMENT

Congress embodied its policy of encouraging diligent,
bona fide mineral development of the public domain in section

47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

claim, although United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1956),
United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 F. 675 (D. Idaho 1910), and Teller v.
United States, 113 F. 273 (8th Cir. 1901), would seem to make the necessity for legislation limiting the possession to that required for mining
purposes questionable, but for cases like Ward v. Chevallier Ranch Co.,
138 Mont. 144, 354 P.2d 1031 (1960), in which the owner of an unpatented
mining claim successfully collected damages from a rancher whose sheep
"trespassed" upon the claim, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
apparent damage to the mining operations, if, indeed, there were any
being conducted upon the claim. The 1955 Act restricts the use of claims
located after July 23, 1955, to "prospecting, mining or processing operations
and uses reasonably incident thereto." 30 U.S.C. § 612 (a) (1964). In Burke
v. Horth, 12 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1926), the court said in dictum that a
mining claim is "property" and, as such, may be the subject of bargain
and sale, mortgaging and disposition by will; however, the locator was said
not to acquire such an estate as to which dower might attach. The
interest of the locator was further characterized as the right to exclusive
possession subject to certain conditions subsequent upon failure of which
forfeiture occurs. This view of a mining claim, as will be seen later, somewhat over-simplifies the mechanics of relocation and forfeiture. See also
Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370 (1932); Mecum v. Metz,
30 Wyo. 495, 222 P. 574 (1924) ; Friend v. Oggshaw, 3 Wyo. 59, 31 P. 1047
(1883). Compare United Western Minerals Co. v. Hannsen, 147 Colo. 272,
363 P.2d 677 (1961), holding even the right of pedis possessio leaseable
like other property.
Lindley suggests that the early recognition of mining rights in the public
domain was merely an application of the common law rule that the
possessor of property is regarded as having the best right thereto as
against all but the true or paramount title holder, i.e., the United States
of America, and that while he cannot be said to have the fee title, the
locator has all the attributes of fee ownership so long as continueddevelopment requirements are satisfied. Various theories of tenure are
suggested as analogous, such as beneficial ownership in which the government is trustee, and common law copyholds. See 2 C. LINDLEY, MINES §§
535-542 (3d ed. 1914).
Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762 (1877).
E.g., Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220, 226
(1904); Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234,
106 P. 673, 682 (1910).
Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955); Bergquist v. West
Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910); Whiting
v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849 (1908).
E.g., Hodgson v. Midwest Oil Co., 17 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1927); Parker v.
Belle Fourche Bentonite Prod. Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948).
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5 of the Act of May 10, 1872.2 This section complemented the
legislative purpose of opening public mineral lands to exploration and purchase by providing for forfeiture of claims upon
(1) failure of the original claimants to perform a statutory
annual minimum of work and development and (2) proper
entry by subsequent locators who comply with the mining
laws and "relocate" or locate new claims on the same ground. 3
Section 5 is now codified in 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964)" 4 which,
in pertinent part, reads:
On each claim located after the 10th day of May
1872, and until a patent has been issued therefor,
not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed
[A]nd
or improvements made during each year ....
upon a failure to comply with these conditions, the
claim or mine upon which such failure occurred shall
be open to relocation in the same manner as if no
location of the same had ever been made, provided
that the original locators, their heirs, assigns, or
52. Ch. 152, § 5, 17 Stat. 91. Cf. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 7.1 and 7.2
(1960). The policy, however, merely adopted the pre-existing custom of
the miners. Id. § 7.2 at nn. 2-4. Cf. Sherwood & Greer, supra note 1, at
6, n. 28.
53. In accordance with 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), the traditional penalty for
failure to do the required annual assessment work is that a mining claim
which is delinquent in annual work becomes subject to relocation by another
locator; the relocation works a forfeiture of the earlier claim. Swanson v.
Sears, 224 U.S. 180 (1912); Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881); Parker
v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Prod. Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948).
It should be emphasized, however, that a claim does not lose its validity
merely because it has fallen into default through failure to perform the
required annual assessment work. As against the government, as paramount title holder, the claim remains valid and may not be invalidated
except for some other good cause such as abandonment, lack of discovery
of valuable minerals, fraud or some like defect. Wilbur v. United States
ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930); Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev.
Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935): Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. 954
(D. Colo. 1966), aff'd., -- F.2d ____(10th Cir. 1969).
54. Congress has from time to time suspended the annual assessment work
requirement of 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) for certain years. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 28a (1964). In some instances the requirement was suspended for all
claimants. In others only certain classes of claimants, such as servicemen
on active duty with the armed forces, were excused. Usually, but not
always, Congress provided a procedure for claimants to use in taking
advantage of the suspension. Typically, claimants were permitted to file
"lieu statements" or affidavits of intent to hold their claims in lieu of
performing annual labor. Often the "lieu" procedure was authorized only
for a limited number of claims. For example, a claimant owning thirty
or forty claims might be authorized in a given suspension year to hold
not more than six of his claims by complying with the "lieu" procedure;
but his remaining claims would be subject to the assessment work requirement the same as in an ordinary or non-suspension year. If for a given
year the Congressional suspension resolution provides a "lieu" procedure,
failure of the claimant to utilize the procedure results in the claim or
claims affected becoming subject to forfeiture, but compliance with the
"lieu" procedure is effective to hold the claim for the entire year. See
Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948); Field v. Tanner, 32
Colo. 278, 75 P. 916 (1904).
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legal representatives, have not resumed work upon
the claim after failure and before such location.
Compliance with the Federal statutory requirement on
assessment work is effected by performing the required
amount of work or by making the required improvements at
some time between the beginning and the end of the fiscal
year for which the claim is to be "represented." 5 5 But assessment work, like location procedure, is particularly vulnerable
to the vagaries of local legislation," and in Wyoming, the
present requirements5 7 can be traced back to the First Territorial Legislative Assembly, which seems to have been concerned as much with the danger of Indian attack as anything
else."
The Federal law at various times in the past prescribed the periods July 1
to July 1, January 1 to December 31, or the year between anniversary
dates of the original location of the subject claims as "assessment years."
2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.3, n. 1 (1960). Under present law, the
assessment year or period within which the work is permitted and required
to be done commences at 12 o'clock noon on the first day of September
succeeding the date of location of the claims and ends at 12 o'clock noon
the following September 1. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1944), as amended August
23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-736, 72 Stat. 829. Thus for any given assessment
year the claimant has from noon of September 1 until noon of the following September 1 in which to do his annual work. If his assessment work
for the preceding year was performed, or if the claim was located in the
preceding year, he is fully protected for the entire assessment year even
though he does not perform his work until the last morning of the assessment year. If, however, he fails to do any assessment work, his claim is
open to location by others from and after 12 o'clock noon on that September 1st. Griffith v. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943). WYO. STAT.
§§ 30-12 and 30-14 (1957) provide that one hundred dollars worth of
assessment work shall be performed during each year from the first day
of July after the date of location and that delinquent claims shall accordingly be open to relocation on or after the first day of July of any year
after such labor or improvements should have been done. The dates must
be regarded as changed by the overriding Federal law. Parker v. Belle
Fourche Bentonite Prod. Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948); Norris
v. United Mineral Products Co., 61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679 (1945). The
1967 amendment substituted "September" for "July" in Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-11
and 30-16 (1957). Law of Feb. 1, 1967, ch. 20, §§ 1-2, [1967] Wyo. Laws
14. Why the Legislature should change the month in but half of the
sections referring thereto is uncertain, but of little significance. As to the
"representation" aspects of assessment work, see Law of Dec. 16, 1871,
§ 1, [1871] Wyo. Laws 114, which relates the term to assessment work.
See also Comment, Annual Assessment Work as Notice to Prospector, 6
UTAH L. REV. 391 (1959), and Note, The Assessment Work Requirements,
9 WYo. L.J. 231 (1955).
56. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.4 (1960); cf. id. § 7.5, and Sherwood
& Greer, supra note 1, at 3-4.
57. Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-11, 30-12, 30-13, 30-14, 30-15, and 30-16 (1957).
58. Act of Dec. 2, 1869, ch. 22, § 25, [1869] Wyo. Laws 312: "Hindrance of
work by Indians shall not cause forfeiture of claims, when it is clearly
proven that work could not have been prosecuted with safety to life or
person." The Indian danger was recognized in the statutes until 1886.
The Act of 1869 was repealed by the Act of Dec. 13, 1873, ch. 17, § 1,
[1873] Wyo, Laws 176, but the Act of Dec. 16, 1871, § 1, [1871] Wyo.
Laws 114, had been theretofore enacted, excepting from assessment-work
requirements those who had been "driven from . . . [the district in which
their claims were situated] by Indians." This latter provision, which
55.
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With the exception of the statute providing for the
recording of labor affidavits, 9 which seems to require that
affidavits be recorded for both lode and placer claims,6" all
of the present Wyoming statutes concern placer claims rather
than lode claims." They no doubt stem from the early uncertainty as to whether the Act of May 10, 1872,62 required
representation of placer claims as well as lodes.63 State legislation in 18864 set forth annual labor requirements for association placers and fractional placers,65 and rules for contiguous placer claims held under common ownership. 6 Two
years later the Wyoming assessment-work statutes were
enacted more or less in their present form.6 7 The contiguity
59.
60.

61.

62.

63.
64.

65.

66.
67.

appeared in Wyo. CoMP. LAWS ch. 85, § 1, at 488 (1876), was repealed by
the Act of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 22, [1886] Wyo. Laws 447.
WYO. STAT. § 30-15 (1957). See notes 60 and 79 infra.
"Upon completion of the required assessment work for any mining claim,
the owner . . . shall cause to be made . . .an affidavit .. .which . . .shall
within sixty days of the completion of the work, be filed for record, and ...
thereafter be recorded in the ... county in which the said claim is located."
WYO. STAT. § 30-15 (1957) (emphasis added). Since the semi-annual six
months' diligent prosecution requirement of 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1964) governing tunnel sites is not the "assessment work" required by 30 U.S.C. § 28
(1964) to which the Wyoming statute refers, and a tunnel site located
under 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1964) is a mining-purpose claim rather than a
mining claim, Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5, at 323-324, nn. 21, 22 and
23, the benefit of recording would appear to be limited to lode and placer
mining claims, even to the extent that assessment work is permitted, under
the Act of Feb. 11, 1875, ch. 41, 18 Stat. 315, now the first sentence of the
last paragraph of 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), to be done in a tunnel (located
under 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1964)), for the benefit of a lode claim or claims.
Cf. note 79 infra, as to the mandatory language of Wyo. STAT. § 30-15
(1957).
Provision was made for lode claims in the assessment-work provisions of the
Territorial Act for Mining Resources Development of Dec. 2, 1869, ch. 22
§§ 3, 4, and 5, [1869] Wyo. Laws 308, under the Federal Act of July 26,
1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, but the Wyoming statutes were geared to the
lode-length footage provisions of the 1866 Act of Congress, and were all
repealed by the Law of Dec. 13, 1873, ch. 17, § 1, [1873] Wyo. Laws 176.
Ch. 152, § 5, 17 Stat. 91, now 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). The statute then and
now refers to "each claim located after the 10th day of May 1872," but it
also refers to "all claims located prior to the 10th day of May 1872" as to
"each one hundred feet in length along the vein," notwithstanding the Act
of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217, recognizing placer claims. But see
note 80 infra.
See note 62 supra and 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.11 (1960).
Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 10, [1886] Wyo. Laws 442-443. This statute
provided that expenditures "made in buildings, ditches to conduct water
upon or from ... [placer] claims, or in making other mining improvements
thereon necessary for the working of such mining claim or claims" would
qualify.
The $100 in annual labor or improvements required by the Law of Mar. 12,
1886, ch. 115, § 10, [1886] Wyo. Laws 442, for 160-acre association placer
claims was no doubt proper, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.12 at n. 2
(1960), but the $15 minimum for placer claims of less than twenty acres
was hardly appropriate under the rule that the minimum for a twenty-acre
claim is $100. Id. § 7.11 at n. 5.
See notes 68 and 71 infra.
The Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 10, [1886] Wyo. Laws 442-443, WYO.
REV. STAT. § 1628 (1887), was repealed by the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40,
§ 26, [1888] Wyo. Laws 91, five of the six numbered subsections of Section
23 of which, at 90-91, and Section 24 of which, at 91, are the forerunners of
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statute,"8 which dates from the 1888 Law6" without change, is
in fact copied from the earlier law,7 ° and is of doubtful validity, unless construed in conformity with the rule which
requires that labor performed outside the boundaries of a
claim must benefit that claim to qualify as assessment work

for it.7
The 1967 Legislature amended and re-enacted two of the
placer-claim assessment work statutes,7 2 making them consistent with the Federal statute as amended nine years

earlier,73 but might just as well have repealed them, since
one is at most declaratory of the Federal law" and the other,
which implies that placer locators can hold their claims without performing further assessment work after having perthe present WYO. STAT. §§ 30-11 through 30-16 (1957). Section 23(4) of
the 1888 law, permitting regulation by mining districts of the amount and
manner of accomplishment of assessment work on placer claims, Wyo. REv.
STAT. § 2557 (1899), was repealed by the Law of Feb. 14, 1901, ch. 41,
§ 1, [1901] Wyo. Laws 39, which was just as well, since the 1888 law
attempted to permit the district laws to require annual labor in an amount
"greater or less than the amount" set forth elsewhere in Section 23 of that
law for placer claims not in organized districts. This was clearly repugnant
to R.S. § 2324, now 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), if the Federal law required
assessment work on placer claims. Cf. note 80 infra.
68.

Wyo. STAT. § 30-13 (1957).

69. Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 23 (3), [1888] Wyo. Laws 90.
70. Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 10, [1886] Wyo. Laws 442.
71. "Because of the nature of placer deposits, it is difficult to establish that
work on one placer claim benefits adjoining claims." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING § 7.16 at n. 5 (1960), citing Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Prod.
Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948). Even if claims are contiguous, the
work performed for a claim must benefit it, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING
§§ 7.16 at n. 9 and 7.19 at n. 4 (1960), and Wyo. STAT. § 30-13 (1957) can
hardly be construed to provide otherwise. See infra at notes 89-92.
72. WYO. STAT. §§ 30-11 and 30-16 (1957), amended by Law of Feb. 1, 1967,
ch. 20, §§ 1-2, [1967] Wyo. Laws 14. Cf. note 55 supra, pointing out that
the Legislature overlooked two other sections in need of the 1967 amendment: WYO. STAT. §§ 30-12 and 30-14 (1957). The latter were, however,
amended by the Law of Feb. 1, 1951, ch. 18, §§ 2-3, [1951] Wyo. Laws
25-26. See note 73 infra.
73. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) was amended by the Act of Aug. 23, 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-736, § 1, 72 Stat. 829, to set the deadline for performance of annual
labor at noon on September 1st of each year. The 1967 amendment of
WYO. STAT. §§ 30-11 and 30-16 (1957), mentioned in note 72 supra, brought
these two statutes into conformity with 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). As originally
enacted, Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, §§ 23(1) and 24, [1888] Wyo. Laws
90 and 91, the Wyoming statutes specified the calendar assessment year
then in force under R.S. § 2324, and the Law of Feb. 1, 1951, ch. 18, §§ 1
and 4, [1951] Wyo. Laws 25 and 26, changed the assessment year to a
fiscal year ending July 1st each year, bringing the statutes into conformity
with R.S. § 2324, which had been amended thirty years before by the Act
of Aug. 24, 1921, ch. 84, 42 Stat. 186, to provide for a fiscal assessment
year ending at noon each July 1st.
74. See note 81 infra. If the statute makes it possible for a placer locator to
hold his claim merely by showing good faith and intention on his part and
his intention to hold possession of the claim, without improvement or benefit
of the claim in the required amount, it is no doubt repugnant to the Federal
law, 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.5 at n. 3
(1960).
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formed such work for five successive years," is dangerously

misleading, since a placer locator might not understand that
the statute is merely declaratory of the Federal law requiring
$500 in improvements upon a claim to qualify it for patent. 6
The obligation to perform assessment work does not, however, stop with the completion of $500 in improvements or
with the filing of the application for patent.77
Proof of annual labor may be made the same ways as
proof of any other overt act.7" This is true even in jurisdic-

tions such as Wyoming which, by statute, 9 provide for recording of affidavits of annual labor performed.

75. Wyo. STAT. § 30-16 (1957) (emphasis added) provides: "When any ...
persons ... have held and worked their placer claims in conformance with
the laws of this state ... for five (5) successive years after the first day
of September succeeding the date of location, then such . . . persons ...
shall be entitled to proceed to obtain a patent for their claims from the
perUnited States without performing further work; but where such ...
sons . . . desire to obtain a United States patent before the expiration of
five (5) years from the date hereinabove mentioned, they shall be required
to expend at least five hundred dollars' ($500.00) worth of work upon a
placer claim." Without the last provision, it might be argued that the
statute is intended to require a placer locator to wait at least five years
to obtain a patent; with the provision, its purpose is not clear unless it is
intended either to make assessment work equivalent to the improvements
required for patent or to permit the locator to apply ("proceed to obtain")
for patent and thereafter avoid assessment work. But assessment work
is required until the patent certificate issues, 43 C.F.R. § 3420.5 (1968), and
30 U.S.C. §§ 29 and 35 (1964) require that $500 worth of labor be expended
or improvements made upon a claim for which patent is sought. It is by
no means clear that labor and improvements which will satisfy the assessment work provisions of 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) will also satisfy the patent
improvements provision of 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964). See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3441.3
and 3470.2 (1968). But see Note, The Assessment Work Requirements, 9
Wyo. L.J. 231, 237-238 (1955), which reaches the contrary conclusion.
76. 30 U.S.C. §§ 29 and 35 (1964).
77. The statute, 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), requires performance of assessment
work "until a patent has been issued" for a claim. Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.5
(1968). In Gillis v. Downey, 85 F. 483 (8th Cir. 1898), it was held that
"the filing of the application for patent does not suspend the obligation to
keep up the required work where, without paying the purchase money, the
claimant permits his application to sleep for years . . . ." Morrison says that
"the fact that sufficient improvements ($500 worth) has been done to
authorize issuance of patent does not dispense with the necessity for the
annual expenditure, which is required . . . 2" E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON,
MORRSoN'S MINING RIGHTS 111 (16th ed. 1936).
78. "The doing of annual labor may be proved the same way as other overt
acts; but in some jurisdictions by statute the filing of an affidavit of
annual labor within a given time after the labor is done makes out a
prima facie case of its performance." G. COSTIGAN, MINING LAW § 84 at
284 (1908). See also 2 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 636 (3d ed. 1914) and 2
The performance or nonAMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.25 (1960).
performance of the work is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial
court, and its decision, if supported by substantial evidence, will not be
disturbed on appeal. Chittim v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Prod. Co., 60 Wyo.
235, 149 P.2d 142 (1944). The burden of proof of showing non-performance
of annual labor is on the one alleging forfeiture. Simmons v. Muir, 75
Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955).
79. Wyo. STAT. § 30-15 (1957) provides as follows:
Upon completion of the required assessment work for any mining
claim, the owner . . . shall cause to be made by some person
cognizant of the facts, an affidavit setting forth that the required
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Frequently recurring questions concerning assessment
work involve the character and amount of work which will
satisfy the statutory" requirement,"1 that is, what will be
considered as such "labor" or "improvements" as are contemplated by law. In Simmons v.Muir,2 the senior locators
had entered into contracts with the United States Geological
Survey and the Atomic Energy Commission whereby these
government agencies were to develop certain uranium claims.
The government was given the right to enter, prospect, drill,
amount of work was done, which affidavit shall within sixty days
of the completion of the work, be filed for record ....
A state law which provided that the annual labor could be proven only
through the use of filed affidavits would probably be pre-empted by Federal
law. See, e.g., Sweet v. Webber, 7 Colo. 443, 4 P. 752 (1884); Norris v.
United Mineral Prod. Co., 61 Wye. 386, 158 P.2d 679 (1945). Though it is
normally the province of a state to determine what types of evidence may
be used in the proof of ultimate facts, such a statute would be repugnant
to the express terms of 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). In Parker v. Belle Fourche
Bentonite Prod. Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948), proof of nonperformance was made on the basis of oral testimony. See also Simmons
v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955), in which no affidavit was filed
but performance was allowed to be proved by other evidence. The Wyoming
statute, WYO.SrAT. § 30-15 (1957), was adopted in its present form in the
Law of Feb. 19, 1901, ch. 100, § 3, 11901] Wyo. Laws 105, repealing the
prior provision of the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 23(6), [1888] Wyo.
Laws 91, which required an affidavit to be recorded with the mining district
recorder within thirty days if the claim was situated in an organized district,
and also required the affidavit "to be made by some person engaged in
performing the work."
80. Title 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) does not distinguish between lode claims and
placer claims in requiring annual labor and improvements. Although Morrison insisted to the contrary, R. MORRISON & E. DE SOTO, MINING RIGHTS

134 (14th ed. 1910), carried forward into E. DE SOro & A. MORRISON, supra
note 77 at 135, the requirement, we think, clearly applies to both kinds of
claim. Compare note 62 supra with Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440 (1883);
St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1882) ; Sweet v. Webber, 7
Colo. 443, 4 P. 752 (1884). Cf. Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d
810, 817 (1955).
81. Federal law specifies for every claim "not less than $100 worth of labor
. . . performed or improvements made during each year." 30 U.S.C. § 28
(1964). Wyoming law specifies, for every placer claim, "not less than one
hundred dollars ($100.00) worth of assessment work . . .performed during
each year," WYO. STAT. § 30-12 (1957), which "shall consist in manual labor,
permanent improvements made on the claim in buildings, roads or ditches
made for the benefit of working such claims, or after any manner, so long
as the work done accrues to the improvement of the claim, or shows good
faith and intention on the part of the owner or owners and their intention
to hold possession of said claim." WYO. STAT. § 30-11 (1957). Cf. notes 64
and 74 supra. The definitions of what may be counted as assessment work
are in addition to the usual state statutes on methods of proof of performance. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.4 (1960). Of course, state
legislation may supplement, but not conflict with Federal law on the subject,
Norris v. United Mineral Prod. Co., 61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679 (1945), and
the $100 value is stated in the Federal statute. The Wyoming statute did
not always conform with the Federal statute. The Law of Mar. 6, 1888,
ch. 40, § 23(2), [1888] Wyo. Laws 90, specified assessment work at the
rate of 62% cents per acre or fraction thereof for placer claims of less
than 160 acres, but not less than $15.00, and $100.00 for a 160-acre placer.
Compare note 65 supra. The change to $100 for each placer claim came in
the Law of Feb. 19, 1901, ch. 100, § 2, [1901] Wyo. Laws 105.
82. 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955).
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explore, and to exclude third parties. There was evidence that
the government agencies performed work in the value of $100
per claim8" for each of the years in question, but objections
to counting this work as assessment work were raised by the
plaintiffs who, as junior locators, sought to assert forfeiture
for the years in question. The Court carefully considered the
question as one of first impression. Noting that work done
by third parties generally may inure to the benefit of a claimholder84 as assessment work, the Court found no reason to
distinguish work done 5 by the government under contract.
The decision was rested on the following factors: (1) there
was clear authority in the government to enter into such a
contract; (2) there was public importance in the development
of uranium, and particularly, there was a relationship to
national security; (3) the government was in privity of title
with the claimant as legal title-holder of unpatented ground ;"
(4) there is no prohibition in the mining law against crediting work performed by government agencies as assessment
work; (5) the government (as a purchaser of ore) was an
"agent or representative" of a claimant; (6) the fact that
the government could have developed the property alone if
In Norris v. United Mineral Prod. Co., 61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679 (1945),
the claimant testified that he actually paid $100 per claim for annual labor
for the year there in question. The Wyoming court reaffirmed its previous
holding in Chittim v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Prod. Co., 60 Wyo. 235, 149
P.2d 142 (1944), in declaring that the value of assessment work is not
determined by the amount actually paid out but rather by the amount that
the work done is actually worth.
84. Compare E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 77, at 114, with Simmons
v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810, 819 (1955). Nevertheless, with certain
specified exceptions, the responsibility for doing assessment work generally
falls on the locator. Where a claim is held by two or more co-locators, the
co-locators are co-tenants, and each has the right to forfeit out the interest
of the others for failure to contribute to the assessment work, upon compliance with statutory procedure. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). Mecum v. Metz,
32 Wyo. 79, 229 P. 1105 (1924). Cf. Hartney v. Gosling, 10 Wyo. 346, 68
P. 1118 (1902). Wyoming once had a statutory procedure governing such
forfeitures. Law of Dec. 16, 1871, §§ 3-5, [1871] Wyo. Laws 115, amended
by Law of Mar. 10, 1882, ch. 70, § 2, [1882] Wyo. Laws 156, repealed and
replaced by Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, §§ 10 and 22 [1886] Wyo. Laws
442-443, and 447, repealed by Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 26, [1888]
Wyo. Laws 91.
85. The type of work actually done in the Simmons case, both by the government and by other parties under contract, consisted of a systematic plan
of drilling holes and testing the holes drilled for fluorescence and with
geiger counters. Upon testimony of performance of work of this type and
expenditures in excess of $100 per claim it was held that sufficient assessment work was done for the purpose of holding the claims for the years
in which the work was done. Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810,
817-818 (1955).
86. So, of course, is a co-tenant of the claim, who bears his share of the
responsibility for doing assessment work on penalty of forfeiture. See
note 84 supra.
83.
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it had so chosen suggested that there was no reason why it
must not do so jointly with the locator; and (7) there existed
a contract with the locator under which the government for
the time in question had the right of exclusive possession.
Sometimes the question does not involve the type of work
performed, but rather where the work must be performed.
In United States v. Ohio Oil Co.," Judge Riner noted that
assessment work performed outside the boundaries of the
claim may qualify as assessment work for the claim. As a
general rule, such work is permitted to be counted as assessment work for as many benefited, contiguous claims as the
reasonable value of the work will support.88 As mentioned
earlier, 9 Wyoming applies that rule by statute to contiguous
placer claims. The statute provides :
When two or more placer mining claims lie contiguous and are owned by the same person, persons,
company or corporation, the yearly expenditure of
labor and improvements required on each of the
claims may be made upon any one of such contiguous claims if the owner or owners shall thus
prefer.
The statute was construed in Simmons v. Muir91 to provide
a presumption that the work done on one of the contiguous
claims benefits all the others. That is, when evidence is
adduced that work was done on one of a group of contiguous
placer claims, it devolves upon the party asserting forfeiture
to show that the work did not benefit the other claims in
the group. That the presumption is and should be readily
rebuttable clearly appears from the decision in Parker v.
87. 240 F. 996 (D. Wyo. 1916).
88. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). But see 2 AMERiCAN LAW OF MINING §§ 7.16-7.18
(1960).
89. See note 71 supra.
90. Wyo. STAT. § 30-13 (1957).
91. 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955). Without the benefit of the statute, as,
for example, where the claims are not contiguous or are not owned by the
same party or are lode claims or where work is done outside all the claims,
the burden of proof rests with the proponent of the work to show that the
work does in fact benefit all the claims. Id., 291 P.2d at 817 (1955). The
Federal requirement that the work actually benefit each claim worried Mr.
Chief Justice Blume in Simmons, but it did not, unfortunately, move him
to apply that standard to the Wyoming statute, except to note that the
party asserting forfeiture can overcome the statute by showing that work

done on one claim did not in fact benefit other claims. We have already
suggested that WYO. STAT. § 30-13 (1957) should not be construed to supply
benefit where benefit does not exist, see note 71 supra, and this should be
so even in the absence of a preponderance of contrary evidence.
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Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Co.,1 2 in which the oppon-

ent of the assessment work was able to demonstrate that
"stripping pits" sunk on one bentonite placer claim to determine the depth, character, and extent of the bentonite beds
in no way bore any relationship to or contributed any benefit
to adjoining claims.
Under certain circumstances the assessment work requirement may be excused. One of these is the enactment by
Congress of a suspension of the requirement."9 Another such
circumstance may occur when a claimant is wrongfully"4 prevented from performing the required work by some third
party. Scoggin v. Miller" was an action by the plaintiff Scoggin in support of his claim adverse to defendant Miller's patent application. The evidence showed that in October of 1944
one Brimmer, an employee of the defendant Miller group of
claimants, went onto their claims to do some drilling work
as assessment work. Scoggin entered the claims for the
purpose of locating his own claims and after a short consultation with Brimmer, Brimmer abandoned his employment
and left the ground. Scoggin proceeded to locate his claims
and later brought the adverse suit relying on his locations
as having forfeited the senior Miller interests. One of the
defenses was that the Miller group had been prevented from
performing assessment work. It appeared that Scoggin, hay92. 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948).
93. See note 54 supra. See also Wyo. STAT. § 30-12 (1957), which provides for
suspension of the state statutory requirement contained therein whenever
the Federal law requirement may be suspended. The provision originated
in the Law of Feb. 1, 1951, ch. 18, § 2, [1951] Wyo. Laws 25. There is
considerable variance among the numerous Federal suspension statutes
enacted for various years and attention to the exact language of the
suspension statute with which one is dealing in determining its effect on
any particular question is crucial. For example, some statutes require the
filing of "lieu statements," while others do not. In certain instances the
locator is limited in the number of claims for which he can claim the
benefit of the suspension statute. For some years the suspension does not
benefit all locators. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, §§ 7.347.36 (1960).
94. In Hodgson v. Midwest Oil Co., 17 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1927), the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that where the plaintiff failed to allege that
there had been a threat by the defendant of violence or physical opposition,
and the plaintiff had offered or attempted to do the work but could not
because it was unsafe to do so, there was a failure to plead the requisite
title in himself to maintain the ejectment action which was brought in the
case. The plaintiff did plead that "The defendants entered upon the land
ousting the plaintiffs' predecessors . . . and have ever since such time
wrongfully and unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff . . . the possession
of the premises." This allegation was held not to be a sufficient statement
of such facts as to excuse the assessment work requirement. Cf. Swansea
Properties, Inc. v. Hedrick, 3 Ariz. App. 594, 416 P.2d 1015 (1966).
95. 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948).
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ing once taken possession of the claims, refused to allow
Miller to come onto the land for the purpose of doing assessment work and, indeed, when Miller's employees attempted
to do so, Scoggin met them at the boundary with a rifle, indicating that he would use it if necessary. The Court held for
the Miller group on the adverse claim and, in a companion
case, 96 enjoined Scoggin from further interference with performance of work by the Miller group.
Although it has been often said that a locator cannot be
divested of title to his claim if, without his fault, the boundaries which he has properly marked are subsequently destroyed,
obliterated, or removed,9 7 the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon has recently sustained a Federal
government contention that a locator must maintain his claim
boundaries as well as his claim, so that government officials
may find and evaluate both the claim and its discovery point.9
It is for this reason that we have elsewhere suggested that
locators should replace lost boundary markings, at least as
often as annual labor is performed.
EFFECT OF NON-PERFORMANCE

The Wyoming assessment-work statutes include a section
on the effect of failure to perform such work, apparently on
placer claims."' This section provides :1o
Upon failure of the owners to do or have done the
assessment work required within the time above
stated, such claim or claims upon which such work
has not been completed, shall thereafter be open to
re-location on or after the first day of July of any
year after such labor or improvements should have
been done, in the same manner and on the same
terms as if no location thereof had ever been made;
provided, that the original locators, their heirs,
96. Miller v. Scoggin, 64 Wyo. 248, 189 P.2d 693 (1948).
97. E.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.37 at n. 1 (1960); E. DE SOTO & A.
MORRISON, supra note 77, at 60.
98. Converse v. Udall, 262 F. Supp. 583 (D. Ore. 1966), aff'g United States v.
Independent Quick Silver Co., 72 Interior Dec. 367 (1965).
99. Sherwood & Greer, supra note 5, at 344-345, nn. 137-140.
100. WYO. STAT. § 30-14 (1957). The words "within the time above stated" must
refer to the period "after the date of location" specified in Wyo. STAT.
§ 30-12 (1957), for the reasons given in note 104 infra, and since Section
30-12 concerns placer claims only, it is most likely that Section 30-14
relates also to placer claims.
101. Wyo. STAT. § 30-14 (1957).
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assigns, or legal representatives have not resumed
work upon such claim or claims after failure, and
before any subsequent location has been made.
The language is so similar to that of the Federal statute.. 2
that the section must have been enacted in response to the
concern that the Act of Congress did not command the performance of annual labor on placers." 3 The legislative history
supports this conclusion,"0 4 and in view of the modern unani-

mity with respect to the applicability of the assessment work
requirement to placer claims,"0 5 there is little, if any, reason
102. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964): "[U]pon a failure to comply with these conditions,
the claim or mine upon which such failure occurred shall be open to relocation in the same manner as if no location of the same had ever been
made, provided that the original locators, their heirs, assigns, or legal
representatives, have not resumed work upon the claim after failure and
before such location."
103. See notes 60-63 supra.
104. WYO. STAT. § 30-14 (1957) is readily traced back to Section 10 of the Law
of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, [1886] Wyo. Laws 442, which was, insofar as the
following language thereof is concerned, plainly devoted to placer claims:
[U]pon a failure to comply with these conditions within the time
above required such claim or claims shall thereafter be open to
relocation on and after the first day of January of any year after
such labor or improvements were due, in the same manner and on
the same terms as if no location thereof had ever been made;
Provided, That the original locators, their heirs, assigns or legal
representatives have not resumed work upon such claim or claims
after failure, and before any subsequent location has been made....
That provision was repealed by the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 26,
[1888] Wyo. Laws 91, and replaced by the substantially similar Section
23(5) of the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, at 90-91, which follows four subsections
dealing with placer claims and is, with the exception of the specified
month ["January" was changed to "July" by the Law of Feb. 1, 1951, ch.
18, § 3, [1951] Wyo. Laws 25-26], in the exact language appearing today
in WYo. STAT. § 30-14 (1957). Prior to the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, the
Wyoming statutes regarding relocation were quite different. The Law of
Dec. 2, 1869, ch. 22, § 26 [1869] Wyo. Laws 312-313, simply granted "any
and all claims held in compliance with" the 1869 Law immunity from
relocation, and provided for relocation of those claims or fractions thereof
not so held. This provision was repealed by the Law of Dec. 13, 1873, ch.
17, § 1, [1873] Wyo. Laws 176, two years after the Law of Dec. 16, 1871,
§ 1, [1871] Wyo. Laws 114, was adopted, providing as follows:
Any person or persons who shall have performed work or made
improvements or expenditures to the amount of one thousand
dollars on any lead, lode or ledge, the same shall not be subject to
re-location under the laws o fthis territory; Provided, That such
quartz claim or claims shall not be abandoned, but shall be represented by the person or persons owning such claim or claims, or
by his or their agent or attorney, who shall reside within the
district in which such claim or claims may be situated, unless
driven from said district by Indians.
The section just quoted was amended by the Law of Mar. 10, 1882, ch. 70,
§ 1, [1882] Wyo. Laws 156, to include placer claims, and, as amended, was
finally repealed by Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 22, [1886] Wyo. Laws
447. If it be true that the Territorial Assembly could fix the annual labor
requirement at a dollar amount higher than that set by Congress, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.5 at n. 3 (1960), this $1000 provision might have
had that effect unless the obvious relationship of the provision to the Act
of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 4, 14 Stat. 251, repealed by the Act of May
10, 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-15, 17 Stat. 91, could be established to have worked
a repeal of the Territorial law by implication.
105. See notes 60-63 supra.
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for the continued existence of this statute, which is, in any

event, now more than ten years behind the current Federal
statute,10" and imprecise besides.10 '

While performance of assessment work on or before the
end of an assessment year holds a claim for the next succeed-

ing assessment year, the locator must again perform $100
worth of work per claim on or before the end of the next
assessment year. Thus, assessment work performed on September 2, 1967, would have held the claims so represented until
noon, September 1, 1968.08 On the other hand, although the

effect of non-performance has been misstated,

°9

it is clear that

failure to do the work required by law does not mean that the

claimant automatically loses his possessory interest in his
claim. The rule, of course, is that failure to do assessment

work merely subjects the ground to relocation by others, but in
the absence of an attempt by others to claim the ground, no for-

feiture occurs." 0 Hence, a locator may hold an unpatented
mining claim indefinitely without the performance of assessment work, and the claim, though open to relocation, is not

forfeited until and unless relocation takes place."' Moreover,
a failure to do the work cannot be raised or asserted by anyone

who cannot, himself, demonstrate that his own conflicting
claim or title was initiated at a time when the allegedly forfeited claim was delinquent in assessment work. For example, in
106.
107.

108.
109.

110.
111.

See notes 55 and 73 eupra.
The 1951 amendment which changed the word "January" to "July," Law
of Feb. 1, 1951, ch. 18, § 3, [1951] Wyo. Laws 25-26, amending Law of
Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 23(5), [1888], Wyo. Laws 90-91, overlooked the fact
that the Act of Aug. 24, 1921, ch. 84, 42 Stat. 186, changed the assessment
year from a calendar year ending at midnight December 31st to a fiscal
year ending at noon on July 1st, beginning July 1, 1922. Even those Wyoming statutes which have been changed to reflect the more recent change
of the assessment year to a fiscal year ending September 1st, see note
65 supra, overlook the change from midnight to noon.
See Griffith v. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943).
E.g., Hodgson v. Midwest Oil Co., 17 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1927), where
although the Court correctly understood the rule, it said that failure to
do annual work results in forfeiture in which all possessory rights are
terminated. To be compared is Burke v. Horth, 12 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1926),
where the same Court suggested that a mining claim carries the exclusive
right of possession subject to conditions subsequent, failure of which
produces forfeiture. These statements erroneously focus attention on nonperformance of the work, which in itself, absent a third party's claim, is
innocuous.
See 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) and note 53 supra; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING
§ 7.26 (1960).
Gillis v. Downey, 85 F. 483 (8th Cir. 1898); Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44,
291 P.2d 810 (1955); Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948);
Griffith v. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943).
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Griffith v. Noonan,"' the evidence showed that the plaintiff
Griffith had located a claim on May 17th, 1939; he therefore
had until July 1, 1940, to do his first year's assessment work.
The defendant Noonan located a conflicting junior mining
claim on May 14, 1940, or a month and a half before the end
of Griffith's assessment year. The court held that the def endant Noonan had no such interest in the property through
his premature relocation.1 . as to be entitled to question the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's assessment work. Similarly, in
Scoggin v. Miller,"4 it appeared that the original locators
were two days late in filing a lieu statement for the year
ending July 1, 1944. The lieu statement actually was filed
on July 3, 1944. Later, the plaintiff Scoggin located conflicting junior claims in October or November of 1944. Scoggin,
in his quiet title action against the defendant senior locators,
attempted to assert a delinquency of the original locators to
comply timely with the statute permitting the lieu statement
to be filed. The court said that late filing of the lieu statement
could be of no advantage to the plaintiff Scoggin, whose rights
did not intervene between July 1, 1944, when the statement
should have been filed, and July 3, 1944, when it actually
was filed. Hence, said the Court, Scoggin had no such interest
as would permit him to raise the question.
TERMINATION OF INTEREST:
FORFEITURE BY RELOCATION

The term "relocation""' as we use it here is taken from
Section 30-9 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes, which, pursuant
112. 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943).
113. Premature relocations are discussed below under the heading "Termination
of Interest: Forfeiture by Relocation."
114. 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948).
115. The processes utilized in amendment of an original location certificate to
correct defects, amendment of an original location certificate to take in
abandoned ground, relocating of a claim by its original owner in such a
way as to relinquish some ground or take in new ground, and relocation
by a third party or stranger to the claim are sometimes confused and
misunderstood. This is probably because several separate matters are
grouped together into two classes and referred to as "Amendment and
Relocation." They have been similarly grouped into two statutory sections,
WYo. STAT. §§ 30-4 and 30-9 (1957). Section 30-4 dates from the Law of
Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 14, [1886] Wyo. Laws 444, which was repealed
and re-enacted by the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, §§ 7 and 26, [1888]
Wyo. Laws 85 and 91. Both the 1886 and 1888 versions were adopted in
substantially the form in which Section 30-4 appears today, except for
the additional permitted cause for such filing: "or in case the original
certificate-was made prior to the approval of this act, and he or they shall
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to the authority and invitation contained in the General
Mining Law,1 16 provides:
be desirous of securing the benefit of this law," which appeared in both
versions and was deleted in Wyo. REV. STAT. § 70-106 (1931). Section 30-9,
similarly, dates from the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 15, [1886] Wyo.
Laws 444-445, which was repealed by the law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 26,
[1888] Wyo. Laws 91. The present section was enacted in Section 21 of
the 1888 Law, at 89, and is substantially the same as the 1886 Law, except
for the addition in 1888 of the words "or monuments of stone." "Amendment and relocation" may be thought of as including three, four, or even
five separate functions or processes. See, e.g., Reeves, Amendment v. Relocation, 14 ROcKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 207 (1969), where the author
proposes clarifying the nomenclature by using the terms "Amendment of
Record," "Relocation by Amendment," "Relocation by Forfeiture," and
"Relocation on Abandonment." Reeves' first two categories include those
things authorized in Wyo. STAT. § 30-4 (1957) to be done by the original
locator of a claim (or his successors) :
Whenever it shall be apprehended by the locator, or his assigns, or
[of?] any mining claims or property heretofore or hereafter located,
that his or their original location certificate was defective, erroneous, or that the requirements of the law had not been complied
with before the filing thereof, or shall be desirous of changing
the surface boundaries of his or their original claim or location,
or of taking in any part of an overlapping claim or location which
has been abandoned, such locator or locators, or his or their assigns,
may file an additional location certificate in compliance with and
subject to the provisions of this act (§§ 30-1 to 30-26) ; provided,
however, that such relocation shall not infringe upon the rights
of others existing at the time of such relocation, and that no such
relocation, or other record thereof, shall preclude the claimant or
claimants from proving any such title or titles as he or they
may have held under any previous location.
It seems reasonably clear that the source of authority to do any of these
things is co-extensive with and included in the general authority in the
mining law to locate claims in the first instance. Although the section
unfortunately uses the word "relocation," it apparently contemplates performing no act other than the filing of paper in the appropriate office.
The statute seems to be directed primarily at the location certificate, as
can be seen by the reference to defects and errors in the certificate which
may be cured. Only incidentally and indirectly does the section provide
for correcting or curing defective acts of location, such as the posting of
notice or the marking of boundaries. What apparently contributes most
of all to confusion of "amendments" under Section 30-4 and "relocations"
under Section 30-9, is the inclusion in § 30-4, in addition to language authorizing purely curative filings of certificates, of other language contemplating
amendments of the identification of ground claimed. These "amendments"
by a claim owner can be divided into two categories: (1) amendment to
change the boundaries of one's own claim from one position to another by
"swinging" the claim and thus taking in new ground and vacating some
ground previously claimed, and (2) a different kind of amendment which,
although it may claim new ground, does not involve changing the original
exterior boundaries of one's claim, as, for example, the amendment of a
junior claim (which has been located with its lines laid over part of a
senior claim) to take in the conflict with the senior claim after abandonment of the latter by its owner. See generaUy Bergquist v. West VirginiaWyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910) ; Slothower v. Hunter,
15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36 (1906). Both categories involve claiming ground not
previously claimed under the original location, and, for this reason, are, in
a sense, relocations of the original claim.
116. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) provides that upon the failure of a locator to do
annual assessment work on his claims, the claims are opened to relocation
by others in the same manner as if no previous location existed, provided
the original locator, his heirs, assigns, or legal representatives, have not
resumed work upon the claims after such failure and before such relocation.
This portion of the statute is quoted in note 102 supra.
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Any abandoned lode, vein or strata claim may be
relocated and such relocation shall be perfected by
sinking a new discovery shaft and by fixing new
boundaries in the same manner as provided for the
location of a new claim ;117 or the relocator may sink
the original discovery shaft ten feet deeper than
it was at the time of its abandonment, and erect new,
or adopt the old boundaries, renewing the posts or
monuments of stone if removed or destroyed. In
either event, a new location stake shall be fixed. The
location certificate of an abandoned claim may state
that the whole or any part of the new location is
located as an abandoned claim.
The statute says that "abandoned" claims may be relocated.
While abandonment has a specific and narrow meaning," 8
117. A relocation is distinguishable from an ordinary location of a new claim
which may happen to have been made in such a way as to overlap part
of a prior, valid claim. A junior, partially overlapping claim cannot appropriate ground where it is in conflict with an underlying claim, so long as
the underlying claim is valid and subsisting. E.g., Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo.
26, 95 P. 856 (1908) ; Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385 (1905). Even where the underlying claim later is abandoned or becomes delinquent, there is no automatic
appropriation of the ground by the junior claim without the filing of an
additional certificate. Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881) ; Griffith v.
Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943); Bergquist v. West VirginiaWyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910). In contrast, a relocator intends, even though he may adopt some features of a prior location,
to appropriate and occupy the ground adversely to any underlying claim
from the time of his relocation. Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88
P. 36 (1906). See generally Reeves, supra note 115, at 213-218. Of course,
an ordinary new location appropriates all locatable ground within its
exterior boundaries, including ground formerly held by valid claims which
were abandoned or became delinquent for failure to do assessment work
prior to the new location, and the statutes do not require that the new
location be designated a "relocation" in order to appropriate such ground.
Any new location which happens to cover ground which was once claimed
but is now open is in this limited sense a "relocation." But, strictly speaking, the term "relocation" is properly reserved for those locations in which
the relocator establishes a link between an earlier location and his own by
adopting something, such as the earlier discovery, or the earlier boundaries,
as his own, as is permitted by the statute. The last sentence of Wyo. STAT.
§ 30-9 (1957) is, fortunately, permissive rather than mandatory. Had the
Legislature substituted the word "shall" for the word "may" as the Arizona
Legislature did, the result could well have been a disaster. See Morrison's
discussion of the "mischievous" Arizona law, AIz. REV. STAT. § 3241 (1901),
and the cases involving it, prior to its repeal, in E. DE SOTO & A. MoRRISON,
supra note 77, at 147. Mr. Morrison there concluded that "all such statutes
are useless and produce only embarrassment," and it is noteworthy that
the comparable last sentence of the Colorado statute, Law of Feb. 13,
1874, § 16, [1874] Colo. Laws 189-190, which was most likely the model for
the Wyoming statute, was repealed by the Law of June 5, 1911, ch. 172, § 2,
[1911] Colo. Laws 515. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 92-22-16 (1963).
118. Abandonment has been defined as the relinquishment or surrender of rights
including "both the intention to abandon and the external act by which
the intention is carried into effect." Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 41, 95
P. 846, 848 (1908). See also Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370
(1932). The element of intent is usually emphasized. See Simmons v. Muir,
75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955), and Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming
Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910), both of which reject the notion
that abandonment can come about merely through inadvertance or by the
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the courts have interpreted the statute to include two other
situations in which relocation is clearly proper: (1) where
an original location was void because of some fatal defect," 9
and (2) where an original location was valid, but the locator
has become delinquent in the performance either of the acts
of location 2 or annual assessment work. 2 ' In every case
the relocation is made by a stranger 2 2 and it covers ground
once held or located by someone else. 2 '
The mechanics of the forfeiture are illustrated in Parker
v. Belle FourcheBentonite Products Co.'2 4 There, the defendant company had locations dating back to the years 1935 to
1937. Parker's conflicting claims were located in April of
1942. The question was whether the ground included in
defendant's claims and overlapped by plaintiff Parker's
119.

120.

121.

122.

123.

124.

doing of an act inconsistent with one's existing title, such as the filing of
an amended location certificate.
The classic examples are found in San Francisco Chem. Co. v. Duffield,
201 F. 830 (8th Cir. 1912), in which it was held that senior placer locations
for lode deposits were void and gave way to lode locations made thereafter
by a junior locator making a peaceable entry, and in Slothower v. Hunter,
15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36 (1906), in which the Court held that a location
certificate which did not contain a statement prescribed by statute vested
no title in its claimant. To be compared with Slothower on the point of
sufficiency of location certificates is Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515,
235 P.2d 750 (1951), in which the Court took a tolerant and permissive
view of the statutory requirements where there was evidence of actual
notice to the party raising the point that information was defectively
omitted from the certificate.
E.g., Norris v. United Mineral Prod. Co., 61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679 (1945);
Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673
(1910); Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36 (1906); Columbia
Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo.
244, 79 P. 385 (1905).
E.g., Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955); Scoggin v. Miller,
64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948); Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Prod.
Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948); Griffith v. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395,
133 P.2d 375 (1943).
That is, by someone who is a stranger to or insulated from the original
possessory title. Relocation should be viewed both as terminating an existing
title and as initiating a new title. Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88
P. 36 (1906), is interesting in this regard. The original locator of the Great
Divide claim, having suffered relocation by a third party, purchased the
title of that third party and applied for patent on the relocated claim. It
was held in an adverse suit that the applicant's title and priority dated
only from the time of the third-party relocation which was the inception
of his title, he having elected to insulate himself from his original title.
The ground must have become open to location by the time of the attempted
relocation and, not surprisingly, the burden is on the relocator to show that
fact. Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377 (Wyo.
1960).
64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948). The case involves relocation of placer
claims. The legislature, of course, made no provision for placers in Wyo.
STAT. § 30-9 (1957), but their omission from a statutory section prescribing
rules for the adoption of discovery shafts by sinking them deeper should
not be thought significant in view of the facts that Federal statutes do not
even require discovery work and discovery shafts are neither required nor
are they customarily sunk on placer claims. See Sherwood & Greer, supra
note 5, at 331, nn. 67-68.
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claims was validly maintained so as to have been in good
standing at the time of Parker's locations. If so, Parker's
claims were void. If not, Parker's claims were valid and
forfeited the defendant's claims. The evidence showed that
for the assessment year ending July 1, 1941, no assessment
work had been done on some of defendant's claims. Consequently, those claims were subject to relocation as of July
1, 1941, and were forfeited upon the relocation by Parker
of his overlapping claims in April of the following year.'
The statute specifically authorizes either relocating by
the same method used in the location of a new claim or by
sinking the existing discovery shaft ten feet deeper; in either
case, the existing boundaries may be adopted.1 2 The Wyoming Supreme Court has confirmed adoption of old boundary
and in the intriguing case of Norris v. United
markers,'
Mineral Products Co.,' approved adoption of an earlier discovery, 2 ' which in fact had been made by the same party
doing the relocating but at a much earlier date. In Norris
the evidence was that the defendants had originally attempted
to locate certain placer claims for bentonite deposits in 1936,
at a time when the ground had been made subject to an oil
and gas prospecting permit.
On September 9, 1939, the prospecting permit was cancelled. Thereafter, on September 26, 1939, the plaintiff located conflicting claims over the defendants' 1936 placer claims.
On November 2, 1940, and again on May 31, 1941, the defendants filed amended locations of their 1936 claims. 3 In June
125. Of course, had assessment work been done for the year ending July 1,
1941, the defendant would have had until the end of the next succeeding
assessment year in which to do the assessment work and the defendant's
claims would have been in good standing in April, 1942. Cf. Griffith v.
Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943).
126. WYo. STAT. § 30-9 (1957).
127. Recognizing that the somewhat restrictive language of the statute, referring as it does only to relocation of "abandoned" claims, probably was
intended to apply in any case of relocation, the court in Bergquist v. West
Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910), approved
adoption of boundary markers by the relocator whenever they are at his
disposal and for whatever reason the ground may have become open to
location.
128. 61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679 (1945).
129. Colorado has done likewise under a then similar statute, requiring only
that the relocator have actual knowledge of the prior discovery and that
he elect to rely on it. See McMillen v. Ferrum Mining Co., 32 Colo. 38,
74 P. 461 (1903).
130. Since the defendants' 1936 claims were void as originally located, this filing
of amended certificates could not have served to breathe life into them even
if done after July 1, 1941, when the ground ultimately became open to
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of 1941, the plaintiff did some assessment work, but not of
sufficient value to hold the claims. In August of 1941, the
plaintiff brought a quiet title action to protect his claims
from the defendants, and to enjoin the defendants from interference. After suit had been commenced, the defendants made
new locations on September 5, 1941, and on October 8, 1941,
relying in part on their original 1936 discoveries. On appeal
of a judgment for defendants, the court noted that the defendants' initial locations were void because of the existing oil
and gas permit application. The plaintiff's 1939 locations
held the ground for a time, but the plaintiff's failure, as of
July 1, 1941, to have done sufficient assessment work to
hold the claims meant that the claims were delinquent as of
July 1, 1941. The defendants' September and October locations were therefore made at a time when the plaintiff's
claims were subject to relocation. The defendant was allowed
to rely on and adopt the 1936 discovery as of September and
October, 1941.181
The most difficult problems of relocation are those concerning the timing of the various acts performed by the
relocator and the responses, if any, of the original locator.
While the facts of each case can be complex, the solutions
to the puzzle-like problems are not too difficult if one merely
remembers the fundamental rule that a valid location or relocation may be made only on the ground that is at the time open
to location,13 and its corollary, that the delinquencies of the
location. Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955). See also
Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750 (1951), distinguishing
between cases where a defective certificate is amended and where a claim
boundary is changed so as to take in territory not before included. An
attempt to amend a void claim as opposed to a void certificate more nearly
resembles the boundary change amendment, and cannot be done merely by
filing an amended certificate, at least in the face of a competing, intervening
right. See Sullivan v. Sharp, 33 Colo. 346, 80 P. 1054 (1905); 2 C. LINDLEY,
MINES, § 398 (3d ed. 1914). Appropriately, the amendments were not relied
on by the Court in reaching its decision in Norris.
131. It is the September and October locations on which the defendants relied as
"relocations" of ground once held by the plaintiff. Defendants apparently
made full, new locations and even asserted new discoveries in 1941. Thus,
it was not actually necessary for the Court to permit reliance on the 1936
discoveries as perfected by 1941 relocations. The defendants in Norris were
not regarded by the Court and should not be elsewhere considered to have
"relocated" their own 1936 claims. What they relocated was ground forfeited
by the plaintiff and, had they so elected, they could have relied on their own
prior discovery, their recent discovery, or even the plaintiff's discovery, to
support their relocations. See Wyo. STAT. § 30-9 (1957) which permits sinking the existing discovery shaft ten feet deeper if the relocator chooses, and
note 129 supra.
132. E.g., Griffith v. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943).
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first locator will be treated with indulgence so long as no
intervening right is affected.'8 8
We have seen that the original locator is allowed until the
end of the assessment year to do his annual labor or make
Hence, a claim is not delinquent for
his improvements.'
failure to do work until the expiration of an entire assessment year from and after the end of the last year in which
work has been done.' 5 Nevertheless, it happens that relocations are attempted during the assessment year in which the
original locator still has time to complete his assessment
work. In these "premature relocation" cases, it is usually
held that the relocation is too early and void, even if it turns
the senior claim goes unmaintained for the entire
out that
18 6
year.
Just as a relocation may be premature because made at
a time when the senior claim has not yet become delinquent,
a relocation may also be too late because made at a time when
133. E.g., Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948). The same rule
applies whether the delinquency be in maintenance as in Scoggin or in
performance of the acts of location. For example, it has occasionally happened that a locator has failed to file his location certificate within the
statutory sixty day period prescribed by Wyo. STAT. § 30-1 (1957). It is
clear that the certificate may be filed, albeit late on, say, the 80th day after
discovery, so long as the ground is not properly claimed by a third-party in
the meantime. Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36 (1906) ; Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo.
244, 79 P. 385 (1905).
134. Notes 112, 125 supra.
135. Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955); Scoggin v. Miller, 64
Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948); Griffith v. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d
375 (1943). For example, if work in the requisite amount to hold a claim
was done for the assessment year ending 12 o'clock noon, September 1,
1966, the claim would be validly maintained (even without further assessment work) until noon, the following September 1, and would become subject
to relocation only after noon on September 1, 1967.
136. Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955); Griffith v. Noonan,
58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d 375 (1943). The reason for such holdings is to
prevent entries and locations on valid claims in anticipation of a delinquency
that may or may not occur. In Simmons, the plaintiffs, having made
invalid, premature relocations in June of 1952, prior to the expiration of
the then current assessment year on July 1st, attempted to salvage their
claims by filing amended location certificates on July 2, 1952. The court
did not apparently consider the amendments to have any efficacy as it did
not discuss their effect. In any event, no harm is done by the filing of
amended certificates. See Wyo. STAT. § 30-4 (1957). In the same case, by
coincidence, the defendants, who had valid claims, nevertheless saw fit to
file new claims covering the same ground, but under different names. The
court considered these amendments, which were defective because the certificates contained more than one claim and the claims themselves were for
excessive amounts of ground, mere nullities, which, though void, did not
adversely affect the defendants' earlier, valid claims. The court recognized
that in the absence of an intent to abandon or to evade the assessment work
requirement, the defendants' regrouping of their claims by amendment, even
if erroneously executed, should not jeopardize their vested possessory title
to the ground which they assuredly intended to continue to hold.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss2/2

32

Sherwood and Greer: Possessory Interests in Wyoming Mining Claims

1969

WYOMING MINING CLAIMS

369

the original locator, having been delinquent, has resumed his
assessment work and is once again in good standing. 3 In such
case the belated relocation is invalid for the reason that the
owner of the delinquent claim is entitled to resume work at
any time prior to a valid relocation.'3 8
Without relocation, of course, there is-absent pedis possessio in a subsequent prospector'-no one to assert forfeiture, and the lack of an adverse party willing to relocate an
abandoned claim reflects primarily upon the apparent value
of the ground. It should be nonetheless clear that a mining
claim can be abandoned by its owner,14 and for the same
reason that he gives up on it-lack of apparent value-it
may be many years until the ground is again located. If
relocation does occur, it may be entirely without reference to
the abandoned and perhaps forgotten claim,' and the later
appropriation is a relocation only in the broadest sense. But
if abandonment were not possible, any doctrine of forfeiture
137. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964).
138. See Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948). In that case it
appeared that the filing of a lieu statement due on or before July 1, 1944,
was not actually done until July 3, 1944. Technically, the claims for which
the lieu statement was filed were delinquent between July 1 and July 3.
The filing of the statement on July 3, however, was held to be a resumption
of assessment work by the original locator and a subsequent attempted
relocation in November of 1944 was held to be untimely. In the "puzzler"
category is the question which arises when locator A, who is delinquent in
doing assessment work, comes on his claim and finds B's posted notice of
relocation. What if A hurriedly resumes his maintenance work and does
the required amount of work before B can finish? Compare 2 C. LINDLEY,
MINES, § 408 (3d ed. 1914) with G. COSTIGAN, MINING LAW, 318 (1908 ed.).
Other similar questions are considered in 2 C. LINDLEY, MINES, § 652 (3d
ed. 1914).
139. Even the acquisition of title by adverse possession requires "claim and color
of title." See E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 77, at 489. But compare id. at 486-489 with 30 U.S.C. § 38 (1964) and see also the interesting
recent case of Nugget Properties, Inc. v. County of Kittitas, 71 Wash. 2d
760, 431 P.2d 580 (1967), resolving a dispute between a placer locator and
residential "squatters" on the basis of laches and equitable estoppel, rather
than adverse possession, against the mining claimant. The Washington
Court concluded that the squatters could not establish adverse possession
without occupying and working the ground as a mine, or at least relocating
the claim.
140. See note 118, supra, and 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 8.1 through 8.7
(1960). Morrison concluded that "although a technical abandonment may
at this day be proved as to any sort of possessory title, the subject has lost
much of its importance except in connection with the annual labor acts."
E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 77, at 103.
141. WYO. STAT. § 30-9 (1957). Reference to a prior abandoned claim in the
certificate recorded for a new location will prevent the relocator from
arguing that the old claim was invalidly located. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING § 8.37 (1960), citing Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36
(1906). For this reason, it is seldom wise to refer to abandoned, prior
claims in a location certificate, and the adoption of stakes and discovery
workings is similarly dangerous, although how the latter admits the validity
of the prior claim is not clear. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 8.39 at 262,
n. 4 (1960).
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for failure to maintain a claim would be irrational. There42
fore, since abandonment is not only possible, but common,'
forfeiture through relocation is a necessary adjunct to the
mining law. It is and was intended to be a convenience for
all beneficiaries of the mining law; without it, the entire
hard-mineral appropriation system would have ground to a
One can therefore view the rather complex
halt years ago.'
rules governing terminations of interest by forfeiture in the
light of the conditions under which they developed. In distinguishing abandoned from merely inactive mining claims,
the courts had to sort out claim jumpers from prospectors,
appropriators from speculators, and miners from promoters.
In the final analysis, we can only conclude that the rules have
not only protected well the rights of bona fide prior appropriators from forfeiture (which, after all, is still viewed as
a penalty and only reluctantly enforced 4 4 ), but have also
served the full development of natural resources by reopening
truly stale claims to location and development by those ready
to do so.
TERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATION

The General Mining Law contemplates, but does not
require, application for patent to "land claimed and located
for valuable deposits" of minerals,'4 5 and generally, when
patent issues, the work of the mining lawyer terminates," 6
together with the possessory interest characterized as an
142. "Bureau of Land Management officials estimate that over 6 million mining
claims have been filed on public lands since 1872. Out of this number only
500,000 are estimated to be even semi-active." U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR
REPORT TO PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT:
IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS--ANALYSIS OF CAUSES, 42 (Mar. 29, 1968).
The report does not say how many of the six million have been patented, but
it is obvious, even excluding the number of claims patented, that the number
of abandoned claims is enormous.
143. Compare note 142 supra with E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 77,
at 147.
144. Throughout any consideration of forfeiture proceedings under the General
Mining Law, which includes, incidentally, provision for forfeiture of one
co-owner's interest in a mining claim to another, 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), one
is impressed by the emphasis which Congress has placed upon development
and the ease with which that obligation has been tempered, both by time
(the $100 annual labor provision dates from 1872) and by judicial decision.
See 2 C. LINDLEY, MINES, §§ 624, 645 (3d ed. 1914).
145. 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
146. Although he will often be called upon to examine title to patented mining
claims. See Mai, Examination of Title to Mining Claims, 14 Wyo. L.J. 139
(1959). See also notes 150-151 infra.
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"appropriation." In sum, the perfection of fee title 4 ' to
the land,14 and the mineral deposit therein contained,'4 9
together with some additional rights peculiar to mining
titles... and qualified by some limitations inherent in the
mining law, 1 completes the appropriation process.'5 2 But
the process is no less complete when the mineral deposit has
been mined out, or exhausted, whether patented or not. The
appropriation then terminates,'53 and the right to obtain a
patent expires with it.' 5 4
CONCLUSION

Our focus in this article, as the title suggests, has been
on the right of possession of mining claims before, during
and after their discovery and location. While one might
define the nature of a mining claim in terms of the intralimital and extralateral rights which go with it and also serve
as limitations upon its enjoyment,'5 5 we believe that the possessory title is best described by reference to its creation
upon the location of the claim, then to its maintenance and,
ultimately, to its termination. Thus viewed, the mining claim,
the very viability of which depends upon the continued interest and effort of its creator-owner, can be seen to be at once
a form of property and at the same time an instrumentality
of Congressional policy to encourage the maximum utiliza147. Recent Acts of Congress provide for less-than-fee patents in certain circumstances, e.g., Act of Sept. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 4(d) (3), 78 Stat.
893, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (3) (1964) (restricting the scope of patents issued
in wilderness areas on claims located between September 3, 1964, and
December 31, 1983), and Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 730, §§ 4-5, 68 Stat.
710, 30 U.S.C. §§ 524-525 (1964) (restricting the scope of patents issued
where on the date of the Act or at a subsequent time of location, leasable
minerals are known to exist, or such minerals are leased or applied for
under the leasing laws). Cf. 30 U.S.C. § 502 (1964).
148. With a few exceptions, fee title to the land included in a mining claim can
be acquired only by patent. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-615 (1964).
149. See also note 150 infra.
150. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 26 (granting extralateral rights) and 43 (provision for
easements and other necessary means for complete development of mines)
(1964).
151. The grant of extralateral rights, for example, 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), operates as a sub-surface limitation upon the claims of others. We do not
consider the extralateral right here simply because the concept has yet to
be explored by the Wyoming Supreme Court. There are, of course, other
limitations, such as those relating to lodes in placers, see 30 U.S.C. § 37
(1964), and "tunnel-rights," see 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1964).
152. See G. COSTIGAN, supra note 78, at 395-398.
153. Although there is no reason that possession cannot be maintained under the
doctrine of pedis possessio. See notes 15-18 supra.
154. See Adams v. United States, 318 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1963). Cf. Mulkern v.
Hammitt, 326 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1964).
155. See notes 150-151 supra.
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tion of the mineral resources of the public domain. In essence,
the doctrine of pedis possessio, the annual maintenance requirements, and the statutory forfeiture to co-locator provisions all serve to determine but two things: At what time
does the economic pressure for development of a mineral
deposit become sufficient to require the locator to represent
his continued interest to the world and to what extent must
he do so ? The pedis possessio doctrine requires the prospector
to maintain exploration activities and possession continuously
simply because there will be no pressure to develop until a
discovery has been made. Once made, economics will determine whether development begins immediately, and if development is not yet indicated, representation of continued
interest-that is, negatived abandonment-is and should be
sufficient to hold the property until changes in economics
dictate that development should commence.
Perhaps all understand that there is a fundamental but
seldom-mentioned rationale behind the favor extended to the
first to establish possession. Development of a mineral deposit
will be delayed only by adverse economic pressures. Until
these are clearly reversed, the development policy of Congress
is not truly served by relaxation of the first-in-time, first-inright rule of appropriation. If development of the mineral
deposit remains uneconomic, there will be little competitive
pressure from others for the claim. But with enhanced economic conditions, the likelihood of relocation increases, and
failure to maintain gives way progressively to performance
of minimum maintenance efforts and eventually, perhaps,
to full-scale development efforts. If it does not, it will become
increasingly difficult to persuade jury and judge that the
claim has in fact been represented. And so it should be,
because the representation requirement is the opposite of the
forfeiture provision designed to enforce it; just as the remedy
of forfeiture is stringently applied, so representation efforts
are liberally construed. In either case, the law adjusts tests
and remedies alike as objective economic evidence demands.
The possessory mining claim, even with its title uncertainties,
has proved to be an approach to nature and to economic
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss2/2
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geology which has appealed to generations of prospectors, if
not to those less accustomed to the uncertainties of a high
risk industry.
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